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In the theoretical model, the protection mechanism (patenting or secrecy) selected by the pioneer 
inventor determines who is more likely to achieve the follow-up invention. In case of patenting, 
whether the follow-up inventor infringes on the patent rights by using the patented knowledge 
as input to his research depends on the extent of the implemented research use exemption. We 
find that a stronger research use exemption leads to a lower propensity to patent even if it fosters 
firms’ overall R&D activities. The empirical investigation identifies a positive relation between the 
firms’ belief about the implemented research use exemption and its propensity to patent. This 
suggests that the negative effect of the research use exemption on patenting may be offset by its 
positive effect on overall R&D activities.
The Research Use Exemption from  
Patent Infringement – Boon or Bane?
Essential Issues
A research use exemption enables companies or research institutions to apply patented know-
how of third parties for research purposes for free without being sued for hurting patent rights.
Depending on the extent of its implementation, the research use exemption may be positive or 
negative for stimulating innovation. 
The main task of patent policy is to find the right balance that fosters technological progress by 
contributing to the diffusion of newly generated knowledge while providing sufficient incentives 
to patent inventions. To disentangle these effects of research use exemption, we analyse two re-
search questions: 
(a)  Can a research use exemption contribute to technological progress by fostering firms’  
R&D activities? 
(b) Does the extent of a research use exemption have an impact on firms’ propensity to patent? 
In order to answer these questions, we first model varying degrees of research use exemption in 
a setting of cumulative innovations. One innovation is based on a previous (pioneer) invention, 
which is either patented or kept secret. In a second step, we look for empirical evidence confirm-
ing our predictions using data generated by an online survey conducted in Germany and Australia.
Methods and Database
Key Findings
Patenting an invention does not only entail the protection of a new idea but also involves the 
disclosure of knowledge that could benefit competitors. The publication of patents spurs the dif-
fusion of newly generated knowledge (one of the major functions of a patent system). If we are 
to take this diffusion function seriously, the use of the patented knowledge would be permitted 
in different (but related) areas. A research use exemption strengthens the (negative) disclosure 
effect of a patent and at the same time weakens its (positive) protective effect (since it legalises 
the research use of patented knowledge by competitors in another research process). Yet the re-
sulting product must still be non-infringing with regard to the protected product.
Our theoretical model shows that a strong research use exemption constrains a firm’s incentive 
to patent newly generated knowledge, but increases the overall R&D efforts (as patented knowl-
edge can legally be used by competitors). Our empirical results may serve as an initial indication 
that the positive effects of a research use exemption may outweigh its negative effects. In sum, 
the optimal patent policy keeps in mind both effects when introducing or strengthening the re-
search use exemption and needs to find a well-balanced definition of a research use exemption 
that spurs technological progress while creating incentives to patent.
Research Question and Relevance
Using information that is incorporated in a competitor’s patent is illegal without agreement on 
its use, and the mere imitation of a patented product can be prosecuted by law. Yet if the use of 
all patented knowledge was illegal, technological progress would be impeded, as subsequent 
inventions could not be based on the newly generated knowledge. The research use exemption 
protects patented knowledge used in competitor’s research against the claim of infringement.
Research use exemptions may have positive and negative effects, depending on their scope. One 
criticism against a narrow implementation is that it may hinder technological progress by imped-
ing competitor access to patented knowledge or forcing competitors to re-direct their research 
investments to other (research) projects. A broad definition may result in an inventor’s reluctance 
to patent, as successful pioneer innovators anticipate the use of their patented knowledge as in-
put, making follow-up inventions easier. On the other hand, a broad implementation may exert 
a positive effect on the pace of technological progress, as mentioned before. Thus, the optimal 
patent policy must find a way to balance both effects, implementing a research use exemption 
that fosters technological progress and while maintaining firms’ propensity to patent.
Although most countries have implemented a research use exemption in their patent system, its 
extent depends on the specific legal system and is often only implicitly defined, particularly in 
countries ruled by case law. In this study, we look at the impact of different designs of research 
use exemptions on firms’ R&D activities and on inventors’ propensity to patent. In our theoretical 
model we focus on gradual changes in the scope of the research use exemption. In our empiri-
cal analysis we look specifically at two countries: Germany (statutory implementation of research 
use exemption) and Australia (a case law system). In the latter, the introduction of a broad codi-
fied research use exemption has been discussed since 2004 (see the box for the differences be-
tween the two systems).
How Do Different RUE 
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 Methods and Database
We use two approaches to answer the research questions: theoretical modelling and empirical analy-
sis. In looking at the positive und the negative impact of research use exemptions individually, we 
develop a theoretical model. In this model, subsequent innovation is based on the first, and the like-
lihood of achieving the second innovation depends on the first inventor’s protection strategy. The 
first inventor creates a technological head-start for achieving the second invention. If he chooses 
secrecy, he cannot market the first invention, provided he wants to keep his head-start. If he choos-
es patenting, he will lose (some of) his head-start on account of the disclosure requirement; but he 
will be free to market his first invention and generate profits. Furthermore, if a competitor produces 
a follow-up invention, the first inventor may receive compensation if he successfully challenges the 
research use exemption in court and a fine is imposed on the competitor. 
We distinguish two types of infringement: output infringement and input infringement. It is usually 
assumed that patent infringement takes place on the product market. We refer to this as output in-
fringement. In the absence of a research use exemption, another kind of infringement may occur: The 
use of patented knowledge by rival firms during their research process. We call this type of infringe-
ment input infringement. Our analysis focuses on the latter infringement and rules out the occurrence 
of the former, i.e. if a rival firm is able to achieve the second innovation it does not infringe on the 
patent of the first innovation. We claim that the strength of the research use exemption depends on 
two factors: the legal certainty that an input-infringement will not be prosecuted and the enhance-
ment of technology diffusion. This model allows us to analyse different scopes of the research use 
exemption and to distinguish case law and the statutory research use exemption as special cases. 
Finally, we assess a number of predictions empirically. For this empirical test, we surveyed firms in 
Germany and Australia. Some 200 firms participated.
Research Results
The main finding from our theoretical model is that strengthening the research use exemption, 
i.e. increasing the reliability of the research use exemption and lowering the fine associated with 
Theoretical Model and 
Empirical Test
Theoretical  
Predictions
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Box 1: The implemented research use exemption in Australia and Germany
Australia Germany
•  Case law in Australia up until 2012, but un-
certainty regarding the nature and extent of 
any research exemption
•  Statutory research use exemption (codified 
in German patent law (PatG)):
•  The case law on the existence of an experi-
mental research use exemption in Australia 
dates back to a 19th century case in England: 
Frearson v Loe 9 ChD 48. English case law, 
while not binding, is strongly persuasive.
•  § 11 PatG exempts all non-commercial 
research and trial activities as well as re-
search on patented subjects from patent 
infringement. Research with the patented 
matter remains an infringing action.
•  In 2011, a new bill was introduced into 
the Australian Parliament: The Intellec-
tual Property Laws Amendment (Raising 
the Bar) Bill 2011. The Bill passed its third 
reading in the House of Representatives on 
20 March 2012. It received Royal Assent 
and became law on 15 April 2012 (it has 
become effectual on 15 April 2013).
•  § 11 PatG was extended by Federal Su-
preme Court’s decisions “Clinical Trials I” 
and “Clinical Trials II”, which exempts  re-
search with patented compounds for equiv-
alency tests etc. for the admission proce-
dures before the end of the grant period 
(equivalent to the Bolar exemption in the 
United States)
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an input infringement, increases aggregate R&D investment. If the technology diffusion is suffi-
ciently high, then overall R&D expenditures are higher in a regime with complete legal certainty 
about the research use exemption (as is the case in Germany). But at the same time, strengthen-
ing the research use exemption decreases early inventors’ propensity to patent.
In the empirical investigation we analyse whether the theoretical predictions hold true by using the 
results of an online survey. As the scope of a research use exemption is the same for every firm within 
a given country, and as firms base their decisions on perceptions of the legal and competitive envi-
ronment, we inquired into company beliefs about the implemented research use exemption. It turns 
out that the beliefs of many innovative German firms do not correspond to the actual legal research 
use exemption implemented by German patent law. Indeed, beliefs about the research use exemp-
tion have a positive effect on firms’ propensities to patent a specific invention. At first sight, this con-
tradicts our theoretical predictions. One reason for this is the restrictive design of our model, which 
fails to consider whether the second inventor chooses to patent. An extended model would most 
likely indicate that the research use exemption had a positive effect on second inventors’ propensity 
to patent. As freely available knowledge spurs technological progress, second inventors would pro-
duce more innovations and thus patent more. Our empirical findings indicate that this positive effect 
is stronger for second inventors than the negative effect is for first inventors. In the theoretical model 
we assume that the knowledge-user will always benefit from a broad research use exemption, while 
the knowledge-provider will prefer a narrow research use exemption. But this ignores the fact that 
a knowledge-user becomes a knowledge-provider as soon as he patents his follow-up innovation. 
The change of perspective would ultimately change his assessment of the research use exemption.
Empirical Results
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